

Message Text

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ORIGIN NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 IO-14 ISO-00 PA-02 H-02
SSM-05 SIG-02 INR-10 NSAE-00 PM-05 SS-15 SSO-00
INRE-00 /088 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/P:WBHARRIS:RGH
APPROVED BY NEA/P:GFSHERMAN
S/PRS - MR. CARTER
H - MR. FLATEN
NEA/IAI - MR. SMITH
SSM - MR. MC ANDREW
NEA/EGY - MR. NEWBERRY
NEA/ARP - MR. TWINAM
NEA/ARN - MR. DRAPER

-----033336 160226Z /13

O 160111Z PEB 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY SANA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USMISSION SINAI
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
USCINCEUR
DOD
JCS
CIA
USIA
NSC

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CINCEUR FOR POLAD, TEL AVIV FOR PAO, DELIVER BY 9 A.M.

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING FOR FEBRUARY 15

1. FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING ARE
EXCERPTS FROM DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING FOR FEBRUARY 15.
FYI ONLY SPOKESMAN TODAY WAS MR. KEN BROWN.

Q. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN SAYS THAT HE HAS BEEN INVITED TO
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COME TO WASHINGTON NEXT MONTH TO TALK WITH PRESIDENT
CARTER AND OTHERS. CAN YOU GIVE US ANY DETAILS OF IT?
ALSO, WOULD YOU ALSO TELL US WHAT YOU THINK OF HIS
STATEMENT THAT HE IS COMING TO URGE THE UNITED STATES TO
CHANGE ITS MIND ON THE AIRPLANE DEALS ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY?

A. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN THE KNESSET THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAD INVITED HIM TO VISIT WASHINGTON DURING THE
EARLY PART OF MARCH AND THAT IS INDEED THE CASE. WE
ARE PLEASED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ACCEPTED THE
INVITATION. THE PRECISE DATES REMAIN TO BE SET AND WILL
BE ANNOUNCED AT THE WHITE HOUSE IN DUE COURSE.

THE INVITATION HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR SOME DAYS.
WE WANT TO HAVE THE SAME KIND OF THOROUGHGOING EXCHANGE
WITH MR. BEGIN ON HOW TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE PEACE

EFFORTS AS WE HAD WITH PRESIDENT SADAT HERE RECENTLY.

Q. DOES THAT INCLUDE A VISIT TO CAMP DAVID, DO YOU
KNOW?

A. I'LL HAVE NOTHING ON THAT -- LET ME CONTINUE. WE ARE
CONFIDENT THAT THIS KIND OF QUIET EXCHANGE HELD IN THE
SPIRIT OF DEEP FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED
STATES WILL ENABLE US BETTER TO CONTINUE OUR ACTIVE
EFFORTS TO HELP THE PARTIES MOVE FORWARD.

DID YOU ASK ABOUT HOW THIS WAS RELATED TO ARMS?

Q. YES.

A. IN OUR VIEW THE VISIT IS TOTALLY UNRELATED TO THE ARMS DECISIONS. LET ME ADD THAT WE DON'T CONSIDER THIS TO BE A CRISIS VISIT AND WE DON'T CONSIDER THAT THERE IS A CRISIS IN U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS.
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Q. WELL THEN, THERE SEEMS TO BE A BASIC DISAGREEMENT ALREADY, BETWEEN YOU AND THE ISRAELIS ON WHAT EXACTLY THIS VISIT IS SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPLISH AND WHAT YOU ARE GOING TO TALK ABOUT. HE SEEMS TO THINK IT'S ABOUT THE AIRPLANES. YOU SEEM TO THINK IT'S TOTALLY UNRELATED TO THAT.

Q. YOU WOULDN'T MIND IF HE BROUGHT IT UP, WOULD YOU?

A. NO, WE WOULD NOT MIND IF HE BROUGHT IT UP. I HAVE OUTLINED THE AIMS OF THE VISIT AS WE SEE THEM.

Q. YOU WOULD AGREE THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE QUITE A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE AIMS AS SEEN FROM BOTH CAPITALS.

A. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR ME TO MAKE A GENERAL STATEMENT ON U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS:

IN GENERAL, WE CONSIDER THE TIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES TO BE ENDURING AND STRONG. CLEARLY, ISRAEL AND WE DIFFER ON SOME ISSUES. PART OF THAT RELATIONSHIP, AS IS ALWAYS THE CASE BETWEEN CLOSE FRIENDS, IS A FRANK AIRING OF DIFFERENCES. BUT THESE DIFFERENCES DO NOT IN THE LEAST DETRACT FROM OUR COMMON SEARCH FOR PEACE AND THE LASTING COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ARMS DECISIONS ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY ALTER THE BASIC MILITARY

BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOR DO THEY HAMPER THE CONTINUING EFFORTS TO REACH AN OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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IN OUR VIEW THOSE DECISIONS CONTRIBUTE TO THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED AND GIVE THEM THE CONFIDENCE TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q. ON MARCH 31, 1976, CANDIDATE CARTER MADE A STATEMENT IN THE "ST. LOUIS JEWISH LETTER" OPPOSING THE SALE OF ARMS TO EGYPT THAT COULD BE USED IN A STRIKE AGAINST ISRAEL." AS I GATHER, THE F-15, IF LAUNCHED FROM TWO OF SAUDI ARABIA'S BASES, COULD BE OVER ISRAEL IN TEN MINUTES. I AM WONDERING, IS THE PRINCIPLE OF THIS PROMISE OF CANDIDATE CARTER DEEMED INOPERATIVE REGARDING THE CARTER PROVISION OF SUCH ARMS FOR SAUDI ARABIA?

A. REGARDING STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OR THE PRESIDENT WHEN HE WAS A CANDIDATE, I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE WHITE HOUSE. BUT I THINK WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT SEE THESE PROPOSED ARMS SALES AS PRESENTING A PROBLEM AND CREATING AN UNBALANCED SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q. THERE IS A REPORT THIS MORNING THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IS FURIOUS WITH PAUL WARNKE FOR OBJECTING TO THE SALE OF 60 F-15S TO SAUDI ARABIA. NOW I WAS WONDERING, HOW CAN THE SALE OF F-15S, WHICH CAN BE REGARDED AS ANOTHER PROMISE OF MR. CARTER -- A REDUCTION IN THE COMMERCE OF WEAPONS OF WAR -- AND HOW DOES THIS ADHERE TO THE PROMISE TO SUPPORT THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL? WOULD YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

A. THE ONLY THING I HAVE ON THAT IS THAT CONTRARY TO THAT REPORT, ACDA SUPPORTED THE SALE AS PART OF A MIDDLE EAST PACKAGE -- THE SALE OF THE F-15S TO SAUDI ARABIA AS PART OF A MIDDLE EAST PACKAGE.

Q. EVANS AND NOVAK ARE INACCURATE. IS THAT IT?
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A. I AM JUST REFERRING TO THE ACDA POSITION.

Q. AS PART OF "THIS" MIDDLE EAST PACKAGE?

A. NO AS PART OF "A" MIDDLE EAST PACKAGE.

Q. OR SOME DIFFERENT MIDDLE EAST PACKAGE?

A. I DON'T HAVE THE ANSWER TO THAT FOR YOU BUT I THINK THE IDEA BEING THAT IT SHOULD BE AN OVERALL PACKAGE.

Q. I GET THE IDEA, BUT ARE YOU GOING TO SAY, THEN, THAT MR. WARNKE SUPPORTED THIS CONFIGURATION OF AN ARMS PACKAGE?

A. I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING SPECIFIC ON HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS PARTICULAR CONFIGURATION. ALL I HAVE IS THAT HE APPROVED IT AS PART OF THE PACKAGE.

Q. HE APPROVED THIS NUMBER OF PLANES FOR SAUDI ARABIA?

A. I DON'T KNOW.

Q. YOU DON'T KNOW IF HE APPROVED THE NUMBER?

A. YES, I DON'T KNOW.

Q. YOU DON'T KNOW IF HE APPROVED "THIS" PACKAGE.
HE JUST THOUGHT IF YOU ARMED SAUDI ARABIA, IT OUGHT TO BE
PART OF A PACKAGE -- THAT IS ALL YOU ARE SAYING?

A. ALL I CAN DO IS GO BACK TO THE STATEMENT. THAT'S ALL.
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Q. IT DOESN'T HELP. YOU KNOW THAT STATEMENT DOESN'T
HELP -- IT'S CLEVER, BUT IT DOESN'T ANSWER THE QUESTION.

A. ALL RIGHT, I'M SORRY, THAT'S ALL I HAVE.

Q. YOU SAID THAT THERE WAS NO CRISIS AND THAT BEGIN'S
TRIP WAS NOT A CRISIS TRIP. WHY THEN, DID YOU VOLUNTEER
THE STATEMENT WHICH WAS FULL OF FRANK DIFFERENCES, AND
SO ON AND SO FORTH? WHY DID YOU DO THAT IF THERE IS
NO CRISIS?

A. I VOLUNTEERED THE STATEMENT BECAUSE THE QUESTIONS
WERE SUCH THAT WE WANTED TO MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR.
THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS ABOUT ISRAELI REACTIONS AND WHAT
THIS OR THAT INTERPRETATION MIGHT BE OF OUR DECISION
TO SELL THE ARMS.

Q. HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE IT REALLY -- MEANING
ISRAELI - U.S. RELATIONS TODAY, FEBRUARY THE 15TH?

A. WELL, I THINK THIS STATEMENT HAS GONE TO THAT POINT.

I WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE RELATIONS AS VERY CLOSE; AND
CLOSE RELATIONS DO NOT MEAN THAT YOU CANNOT HAVE
OCCASIONAL DISAGREEMENT.

Q. COULD YOU FIT THIS VISIT INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT
ARE SOON TO START AGAIN ON FURTHER DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES? DO YOU HAVE A TIME FOR ATHERTON TO GO TO
THE AREA? WILL HE BE COMING BACK WHEN BEGIN IS HERE?

A. ATHERTON WILL LEAVE THIS WEEKEND. HE WILL BE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST THE FIRST PART OF NEXT WEEK.

Q. WHERE WILL HE GO?
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A. THE EXACT ITINERARY HAS NOT BEEN WORKED OUT.

Q. HE WILL BE IN THE AREA UNTIL BEGIN'S VISIT?

A. HE WILL BE IN THE AREA MORE OR LESS INDEFINITELY BUT I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING SPECIFICALLY ON WHAT EFFECT MR. BEGIN'S VISIT WILL HAVE -- IF HE WILL BE COMING BACK FOR THAT OR NOT -- I REALLY DON'T KNOW.

Q. A HOUSEKEEPING DETAIL. THE SECRETARY SAYS HE IS THINKING OF MAKING ROY AN AMBASSADOR AT LARGE. WILL THAT BE DONE IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS TRIP, DO YOU KNOW?

A. I DON'T BELIEVE SO. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THAT BUT I DIDN'T HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS BEFORE MR. ATHERTON LEFT, BUT I CAN'T, I CAN'T GIVE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION.

Q. THIS STATEMENT THAT YOU HAVE JUST ISSUED, WOULD YOU HAVE GIVEN IT TO US IF YOU HAD NOT BEEN ASKED ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST?

A. WELL, THIS WAS NOT SOMETHING I WAS GOING TO COME OUT AND PRESENT, NECESSARILY AS A STATEMENT, BUT IT WAS ASSUMED THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REPORTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE, THAT QUESTIONS WOULD RISE THAT WOULD MAKE THE STATEMENT APPROPRIATE.

Q. IF YOU CONSIDERED IT A TIMELY STATEMENT WHY DIDN'T YOU COME OUT WITH IT AS A STATEMENT WITHOUT BEING ASKED ABOUT IT?
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A. AS TO WHEN WE VOLUNTEER STATEMENTS AND DON'T VOLUNTEER

STATEMENTS, I DON'T REALLY HAVE A REACTION. BUT I THINK IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENTS IT WAS FELT THAT THE QUESTION WOULD ARISE.

Q. ON WHAT BASIS DO YOU SAY THAT IT WILL GIVE EGYPT, ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA CONFIDENCE TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT? I ADDRESS MY QUESTION PARTICULARLY TO THE EXPRESSION OF CONCERN THAT COMES FROM ISRAEL AND SOME MEMBERS OF THE HILL. ON WHAT BASIS DO YOU BELIEVE THAT IT GIVES THEM CONFIDENCE?

A. I DON'T REALLY HAVE ANYTHING FOR YOU ON THAT. WE HAVE HAD THE DISCUSSIONS, THE BACKGROUNDEERS ON THIS,

AND THE ON-THE-RECORD COMMENTS, AND I REALLY DON'T HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER TO ADD TODAY. THERE WILL BE FURTHER PRESENTATIONS TO CONGRESS WHEN THIS QUESTION COMES UP BEFORE CONGRESS THIS MONTH.

Q. YES, WELL THEN COULD YOU PLEASE, THEN, TAKE THAT AS A QUESTION, SINCE IT BECOMES A MAJOR PART OF YOUR EXPLANATION FOR PROVIDING THE WEAPONS AT THIS TIME. "THESE DECISIONS CONTRIBUTED TO LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS" THAT'S A JUDGMENT. THE OTHER ONE THAT "IT GIVES THEM THE CONFIDENCE" I DON'T QUITE UNDERSTAND THAT IN LIGHT OF THE EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN FROM ONE OF THE THREE COUNTRIES. IT WOULD APPEAR ON THE SURFACE, GIVEN THOSE EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN, THAT IT GIVES THEM LESS CONFIDENCE.

A. THESE ARE CONSIDERATIONS THAT WENT INTO OUR DECISION AND THESE ARE JUDGMENTS THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE. WE, OBVIOUSLY, CAN'T DECIDE ON SOMEBODY ELSE'S BEHALF HOW UNCLASSIFIED

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THEY ARE GOING TO REACT TO SOMETHING. BUT THESE WERE JUDGMENTS THAT WE MADE IN THE CONSIDERATION THAT WAS GIVEN TO THIS DECISION.

Q. BOTH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, YESTERDAY, AND YOU TODAY, HAVE REPEATED THE BELIEF THAT THIS WILL NOT AFFECT THE MILITARY BALANCE. IF ANYTHING, IT WILL RESTORE IT. COULD YOU MAKE AVAILABLE TO US WHATEVER STATE DEPARTMENT STUDIES YOU HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT POINT?

A. I WOULD EXPECT THAT WE COULD NOT MAKE THOSE AVAILABLE.

Q. THEN, WE'LL JUST HAVE TO ACCEPT IT ON FAITH UNTIL YOU DO.

A. I'M SAYING THAT THIS IS OUR CONSIDERED JUDGMENT.

Q. OBVIOUSLY, SOME PEOPLE DISAGREE. CAN YOU GO TO YOUR PEOPLE AND TRY TO EXPLAIN TO US HOW IT DOES RESTORE THE MILITARY BALANCE?

A. I WILL ASK IF THERE IS ANYTHING WE CAN PUT ON THE RECORD REGARDING THIS QUESTION OF BALANCE.

Q. IN HIS STATEMENT TODAY TO THE KNESSET, MR. BEGIN ASKED THE UNITED STATES TO FORMALLY RECONSIDER THE SALE OF ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND TO EGYPT AND TO ADD MORE PLANES TO THE CONTINGENT EARMARKED FOR ISRAEL. WHAT IS YOUR RESPONSE TO THAT?

A. THE SECRETARY'S ANNOUNCEMENT YESTERDAY MADE CLEAR THAT

THE DECISIONS HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED AND THAT THE CONCERNS AND CONSIDERATION S OF OTHERS WERE PART OF THE UNCLASSIFIED

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DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

I THINK THIS GOES TO A PREVIOUS QUESTION AS WELL. AS THE SECRETARY SAID YESTERDAY, WE WERE AWARE THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WAS NOT HAPPY WITH OUR DECISION ON SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT. WE HAVE EXPLAINED OUR DECISIONS TO ISRAEL. WE HOPE THAT IN THE DAYS AHEAD, AS OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS PROCEED, THAT THE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE DECISIONS WILL BE ANSWERED.

Q. DOES THIS MEAN THAT YOU ARE REJECTING MR. BEGIN'S CALL FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF THE SALE PROPOSALS?

A. THE DECISION IS A FIRM DECISION AND WE HAVE MADE CLEAR WHAT WENT INTO THAT DECISION, I BELIEVE.

Q. SO THIS MEANS YOU WILL NOT BE RECONSIDERING THE SALE PROPOSALS?

A. THE STATEMENT I JUST MADE I THINK RESPONDS TO THAT. THIS IS A FIRM DECISION THAT WAS BASED ON CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS. AND WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF OTHERS.

Q. I'M SORRY, BUT I DON'T SEE HOW THAT LAST ANSWER YOU HAVE EVEN BEGINS TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION. I THINK, IN FACT, IT SIMPLY ADDS TO THE QUESTION. IN YOUR INITIAL STATEMENT THAT YOU MADE, YOU SPOKE OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT CLEARLY EXIST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND

ISRAEL AND YOU HAVE SIMPLY UNDERSCORED THAT ONCE AGAIN; AND IN THAT CONTEXT, KNOWING THAT THE DIFFERENCES EXISTED, KNOWING THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE UNHAPPY ABOUT IT, PERHAPS I COULD JUST ADD MY QUESTION. I WONDER IF YOU COULD COME BACK WITH A MORE FORCEFUL ANSWER AS TO UNCLASSIFIED

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HOW AND WHY YOU BELIEVE THAT YOU BELIEVE THIS GIVES THE PARTIES ADDITIONAL CONFIDENCE IN MOVING TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT?

A. WELL, THERE ARE SEVERAL PARTIES INVOLVED.

Q. I'M SPEAKING SPECIFICALLY ABOUT ONE PARTY. I DON'T DOUBT THAT THE SAUDIS ARE HAPPIER NOW THAN THEY WERE

YESTERDAY.

A. I THINK THE BEST ANSWER I CAN GIVE YOU IS THAT WE TRIED TO LOOK AT THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL BALANCE IN THE REGION. THIS WAS PUT FORTH AS A PROPOSAL WHICH CONSIDERS MORE THAN ONE COUNTRY AT A TIME, AND THE NEEDS OF ALL THESE COUNTRIES WERE LOOKED AT AT THE SAME TIME AND CONSIDERED TOGETHER.

Q. WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT "OVERALL BALANCE IN THE REGION," I WAS UNAWARE THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS EVER CONSIDERED TO BE A CONFRONTATION STATE.

A. IT IS NOT.

Q. WHAT DOES SAUDI ARABIA, THEN, HAVE TO DO WITH THE OVERALL BALANCE IN THE REGION?

A. IT'S IN THE REGION.

Q. I UNDERSTAND. ARE YOU SPEAKING OF SOME OTHER BALANCE THAN BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES?

A. I'M TALKING ABOUT THE GENERAL BALANCE IN THAT REGION. I'M TALKING ABOUT THE BALANCE BETWEEN ISRAEL
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AND THE ARAB STATES.

Q. AND I REPEAT MY QUESTION: WHAT DOES SAUDI ARABIA HAVE TO DO WITH IT? IT'S NEVER BEEN A CONFRONTATION STATE; ISRAEL HAS NEVER ATTACKED SAUDI ARABIA, NOR TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE HAS SAUDI ARABIA ATTACKED ISRAEL

A. MY ANSWER IS THE SAME. IT'S IN THE REGION -- WE'RE TALKING ABOUT REGIONAL BALANCE. I DON'T THINK THAT NECESSARILY HAS TO INVOLVE ONLY THE CONFRONTATION

STATES.

Q. IS SAUDI ARABIA SUPPORTING THE SADAT INITIATIVE?

A. I DON'T HAVE AN UP-TO-DATE READOUT FOR YOU ON SAUDI ARABIA'S VIEWS ON THAT.

Q. ONE OF THE REACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO ISRAELI SOURCES YESTERDAY RAISED THE SPECTOR OF AMERICAN MERCENARIES FLYING THESE F-15S IN A WAR AGAINST ISRAEL. DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO THAT?

A. THERE ARE NO CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH I COULD FORESEE F-15S BEING FLOWN BY --

Q. IT WAS OFFERED SERIOUSLY. THAT IS WHY I ASKED.

A. DO YOU MEAN WITH AMERICAN GOVERNMENT APPROVAL?

Q. NO, NO. MERCENARIES.

A. NO. I UNDERSTAND.

Q. ON THE THEORY THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO FIND PEOPLE WHO
KNOW HOW TO FLY THE PLANE. THE SAUDIS CON'T KNOW HOW
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TO FLY THE PLANE. THEY WOULD HAVE TO HIRE PILOTS IS
THE POINT.

A. I WOULD ASSUME THAT WE WOULD TAKE STEPS TO MAKE SURE
THAT AMERICANS WERE NOT INVOLVED IN FIGHTING AGAINST
ISRAEL.

Q. COULD YOU ADDRESS YOURSELF TO THE QUESTION OF THE
PACKAGE BECAUSE THERE IS SOME CONFUSION ABOUT IT?
IF PART OF THE PACKAGE IS NOT APPROVED BY THE CONGRESS, IS
THE ADMINISTRATION GOING, THEN, TO RECONSIDER THE OTHER
PARTS OF THE PACKAGE?

A. THE SENIOR OFFICIAL WHO HELD THE BACKGROUNDER ON THIS
I BELIEVE ANSWERED THIS QUESTION.

Q. I DON'T REALLY THINK IT WAS ANSWERED, BUT IF YOU
THINK IT WAS, THEN COULD YOU TELL ME NOW WHAT YOU THINK
IT IS THAT THE SENIOR OFFICIAL SAID?

A. I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ON THE RECORD FOR YOU.

Q. YOU CAN GO ON BACKGROUND.

A. I DON'T HAVE THE MATERIAL WITH ME, BUT I'LL BE
HAPPY TO REVIEW WHAT WAS SAID ON BACKGROUND.

Q. COULD YOU TAKE THAT, THEN, AS AN ON-THE-RECORD
QUESTION?

A. I WILL TAKE IT AS AN ON-THE-RECORD QUESTION. I'M
NOT ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN I CAN GIVE YOU AN ON-THE-RECORD
ANSWER, BUT I WILL TAKE IT.
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Q. BECAUSE THERE IS AN IMPRESSION THAT THE ADMINISTRA-
TION IS GOING TO RECONSIDER IT, IF PART, IF A THIRD OF

THE TROIKA, IS CUT OFF. IS THAT THE IMPRESSION THAT YOU WANT TO BE SPREAD PUBLICLY?

A. I DON'T WANT TO LEAVE ANY IMPRESSION THAT WASN'T GIVEN IN THE BACKGROUNDER, AND I'LL LOOK FURTHER INTO IT.

Q. REPHRASING THE QUESTION YOU WERE ASKED IN A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT WAY, BUT MAYBE YOU CAN ANSWER IT IN THIS WAY: WHY DOES THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONSIDER IT NECESSARY AT THIS POINT TO REAFFIRM ITS CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH ISRAEL?

A. SPECIFICALLY, WE STARTED CONSIDERING THE REACTION THAT I GAVE YOU AFTER THE ISRAELIS' REACTIONS IN REGARD TO THE ARMS SALES AND AFTER CERTAIN STATEMENTS WERE MADE IN THE KNESSET AND AFTER THERE WAS SPECULATION ABOUT A CRISIS IN ISRAELI-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

Q. WHERE WAS THAT SPECULATION?

A. IN PRESS REPORTS.

Q. YES. YOU SAID, "I WOULD ASSUME THAT WE WOULD TAKE STEPS TO SEE THAT NO AMERICANS ARE INVOLVED AS MERCENARIES AGAINST ISRAEL." THAT WAS YOUR STATEMENT, AS I RECALL IT.

A. THAT NO AMERICAN S WOULD BE INVOLVED (INAUDIBLE)

A. I WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IF YOU COULD TELL ME ON WHAT BASIS DO YOU MAKE SUCH AN ASSUMPTION, GIVEN THE EXECUTION OF ONE AMERICAN MERCENARY IN ANGOLA AND THE REPORTS THAT THERE ARE DOZENS IF NOT HUNDREDS OF UNCLASSIFIED

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AMERICAN MERCENARIES -- IF THAT TERM IS DISPUTABLE -- NOW SERVING IN THE RHODESIAN ARMY?

A. I DO NOT HAVE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON THIS. I MAKE MY STATEMENT ON THE BASIS OF OUR LONG-TERM AND ABIDING COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

Q. BUT WHAT MEASURES WOULD THE UNITED STATES TAKE TO INHIBIT SOME AMERICANS FROM FLYING -- THE SAUDI ARABIANS WOULD PAY WELL. WHAT DO YOU THINK WOULD INHIBIT THE AMERICAN MERCENARIES FROM FLYING FOR THE SAUDI ARABIANS? COULD YOU TELL US THAT?

A. I DO NOT KNOW THE FULL LEGAL POSITION ON THIS. THIS IS SOMETHING I WOULD HAVE TO LOOK INTO.

Q. THERE IS A REPORT CIRCULATING THAT THE SECRETARY,

IN ONE OF THOSE ENDLESS BRIEFINGS ON THE HILL, SAID THAT THE SAUDIS IN FACT WANT SADAT TO BREAK OFF THE TALKS WITH ISRAEL. COULD YOU PLEASE TAKE THIS QUESTION AND TELL ME WHETHER THE SAUDIS IN FACT SUPPORT OR REJECT THE SADAT INITIATIVE?

A. I DON'T THINK I'M GOING TO BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU ANYTHING ON THE SAUDI POSITION. I THINK THAT WOULD NEED TO COME FROM THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT.

Q. MAYBE YOU CAN GIVE US THIS. CAN SOMEBODY IN THIS BUILDING PRODUCE STATEMENTS BY THE SAUDIS, PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTING SADAT'S INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA IS BEING JUSTIFIED OR RATIONALIZED PARTLY ON THE COOPERATION IN SUPPORTING THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. I DON'T FIND THEM OPPOSING IT UNCLASSIFIED

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VERBALLY, BUT HAVE THE SAUDIS EVER SAID ANYTHING FOR THE RECORD THAT YOU CAN SHOW US THAT SHOWS THAT THEY ARE ON YOUR SIDE?

A. I REALLY THINK THAT IS SOMETHING THAT NEEDS TO COME FROM THE SAUDIS, ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT.

Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN? YOU'VE SAID -- NOT YOU, THE SECRETARY AND OTHER PEOPLE HERE -- HAVE SAID THAT THE SAUDIS ARE SUPPORTING OR COOPERATING, AND I COULDN'T DOCUMENT IT MYSELF. I WONDERED IF YOU COULD, IF THE STATE DEPARTMENT COULD DOCUMENT THAT CLAIM?

A. I THINK ANYTHING ON THE PUBLIC RECORD REGARDING THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT SHOULD COME FROM THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT.

Q. I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT WHAT THE SAUDIS HAVE SAID.

YOU HAVE SAID, THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS SAID THE SAUDIS ARE SUPPORTING THE SADAT INITIATIVE. DO YOU HAVE ANY FACTS TO BACK THAT UP?

A. I BELIEVE THE STATEMENT WAS THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE TAKEN A SUPPORTIVE ROLE IN TRYING TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

A. AND WE SHOULD ACCEPT THAT ON FAITH, IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE SAYING?

A. I'M SAYING THAT IN RESPONSE TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTION ABOUT WHAT THE SAUDI POSITION IS, THE PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT WHAT THE SAUDI POSITION IS SHOULD COME FROM THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT.

Q. YOU SAID IN YOUR STATEMENT THAT THE VISIT IS TOTALLY UNCLASSIFIED

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UNRELATED TO THE ARMS DECISION. THE SECRETARY SAID LAST NIGHT THAT THE PARTIES WERE NOTIFIED OF THE ARMS DECISION ON MONDAY. WHEN DID THE INVITATION TO BEGIN GO?

A. I DON'T HAVE AN ANSWER TO THAT. I JUST KNOW THAT IT HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR SOME DAYS. I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING SPECIFIC ON WHEN THE INVITATION WAS SENT. I WOULD STAND BY THE STATEMENT I MADE REGARDING OUR VIEW OF THE VISIT THAT HE'S NOT COMING HERE TO DISCUSS THE ARMS SALES; HE'S COMING HERE TO DISCUSS THE OVERALL QUESTION OF A SETTLEMENT.

Q. DURING OR JUST PRIOR TO THE SADAT VISIT, WE WERE TOLD THAT PRIME MINISTER WAS COMING HERE -- AND FORGIVE ME; I FORGET NOW WHETHER IT WAS APRIL OR MAY -- THAT THERE HAD BEEN A LONGSTANDING PLAN FOR HIM TO COME HERE AND THAT, IN EFFECT, WAS GOING TO BE THE SECOND PART OF THOSE TWO LEGS. SADAT WAS COMING FOR THE ONE VISIT, BEGIN WAS COMING FOR THE OTHER.

NOW, IF IT WAS NOT THE ARMS SALES OR THE ARMS PACKAGE THAT HAS PROMPTED THAT SCHEDULE TO BE MOVED UP, WHAT WAS IT?

A. I ONLY HAVE THE GENERAL RESPONSE THAT I'VE ALREADY GIVEN, OUTLINING OUR VIEW OF THE REASONS FOR THE VISIT. I REALLY DON'T HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN THAT.

Q. I'D LIKE TO FOLLOW THAT UP. IS THIS PART OF A TREND: MR. BEGIN CAME IN DECEMBER, MR. SADAT IN

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SO CAN WE EXPECT MR. SADAT LIKE IN MAY OR APRIL AGAIN -- SERIOUSLY.

A. NO. I WOULDN'T SAY THAT IT'S NECESSARILY PART OF A TREND. I WOULD SAY THAT WHEN THE LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES THINK THAT IT'S APPROPRIATE TO HAVE FACE-TO-FACE CONVERSATION, THEN AT THAT TIME THEY WOULD WORK OUT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS. I WOULDN'T SAY NECESSARILY THAT A PATTERN IS DEVELOPING.

Q. ON PAGE 404 OF THE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

AND PRACTICES, IT SAYS UNDER SAUDI ARABIA: "ISLAM IS THE ESTABLISHED RELIGION OF SAUDI ARABIA AND SAUDIS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO PRACTICE OTHER RELIGIONS, ALTHOUGH NON-MOSLEM FOREIGNERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO HOLD PRIVATE AND DISCREET RELIGIOUS SERVICES."

MY QUESTION IS: ARE WE AS CONCERNED ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN SAUDI ARABIA AS WE ARE ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN ARGENTINA?

A. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ALL OVER THE WORLD.

2. THE FOLLOWING WAS POSTED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS OFFICE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION TAKEN AT THE FEBRUARY 13 NOON BRIEFING.

Q. DOES THE U.S. ACCEPT THAT THERE IS A BASIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE SYRIAN TROOPS TO BE IN LEBANON, AND IF SO WHAT IS THIS BASIS?

A. SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON ARE PART OF THE ARAB LEAGUE-SPONSORED ARAB DETERRENT FORCE, WHOSE PRESENCE IN THAT COUNTRY WAS REQUESTED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS A SOVEREIGN DECISION BY A CONSTITUTIONAL
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GOVERNMENT.

VANCE

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Message Attributes

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Decaption Note:
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